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DWIGHT R. LEE,* PHILIP E. GRAVES,**
and ROBERT L. SEXTON***

On Mandatory Deposits, Fines, and
the Control of Litter
ABSTRACT
Mandatory deposits on beverage containershave received enthusiastic support among environmentalists as a means of controlling
litter. In modeling the effects of a deposit on litter generation and
recovery it isfound that this enthusiasm is well justified. Interestingly
enough, few supportersof deposits seem to realize how justified their
support is, as evidenced by their lack of enthusiasmfor eliminating
the litteringfine which serves to dilute the effectiveness of the deposit.
The most efficient solution possible when a fine is combined with a
deposit is shown to require less littering, but more litter, than is an
efficient solution when relying entirely on the deposit.
INTRODUCTION
There has been much enthusiasm among environmentalists for mandatory deposits on beverage containers. In their enthusiasm they appear
to be joining hands with economists in support of pollution taxes to
provide motivational guidance to a cleaner environment. Both agree that
beverage container deposits should serve to deter litter pollution. If anything environmentalists are even more optimistic about the effectiveness
of mandatory deposits than are economists. Less than two years after
mandatory deposits went into effect in Oregon, J. R. Quarles, then Deputy
Administrator of Environmental Protection Agency (E.P.A.), stated that
Oregon had experienced litter reductions of 75 to 85 percent.'
The support among economists for pollution taxes is based not only
*Ramsey Professor Economics, University of Georgia.
**Professor of Economics, University of Colorado.

***Associate Professor of Economics, Pepperdine University.
1. Hearings Before the Senate Subcommittee on the Environment in May 1974. There is anything
but general agreement, however, on the effectiveness of manadatory deposits in reducing litter. J.
T. Pollock, Chairman of the Board, Glass Container Manufacturers Institute, commenting on the
Oregon experience in April 1975, Before the House Subcommittee on Transportation and Commerce,
stated that, "littering of beverage containers increased by 127%." For detailed references to these
statements see R. C. Porter, A Social Benefit-Cost Analysis of Mandatory Deposits on Beverage
Containers, 5 J. Envtl. Econ, & Mgmt., at 357 (Dec. 1978). With the per-bottle deposit in Oregon
ranging from 2 to 5 cents, Quarles' claim suggests that the demand for littering is rather responsive
to price. But independent of the quantitative accuracy of his statement he is certainly more conventional than Pollock in assessing the slope of demand curves.
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on reduced pollution, but also on the desire to have this reduction guided
by as much pertinent information as possible. It is reasonable to rely on
the collective decisionmaking process to roughly assess the marginal
benefit from reducing the discharge of a particular pollutant, this assessment being the basis for the pollution tax.' It is completely unreasonable
to rely on such a process to determine the marginal cost of abatement
and the best abatement response for each and every polluter. This information is contained in the preferences, prices and technologies which
apply to each situation; information that each polluter is in the best position
to evaluate. Therefore, by imposing a collectively determined pollution
tax and allowing individual polluters to respond to it as they see fit,
decisions on how, and how much, pollution is reduced will be informed
by more relevant information than could possibly be acquired by even
the most diligent group of pollution planners.
Of course, under the tax approach an individual can pollute with impunity as long as the required tax is payed on each unit of discharge. If
the case for mandatory deposits is the same as that for pollution taxation
in general, then, having paid the mandatory deposit individuals should
be able to discard their beverage containers as litter along the highways
without further penalty. But, as convinced as supporters of mandatory
deposits are that these deposits are effective at discouraging litter, as far
as these authors know, none of the supporters have suggested that deposits
replace fines on those who litter beverage containers. Is this a case of
the advocates of mandatory deposits finding complete reliance on deposits
requiring too much tolerance of those lacking the proper environmental
morality, or can an efficiency argument be made for both deposits and
fines?3
In taking a careful look at the efficiency implications arising from the
use of mandatory deposits for controlling litter, some interesting differences between these deposits and the commonly discussed pollution taxes
will be found, though deposits can be used to achieve efficient litter
control. It will also be found that a littering fine, either with or without
mandatory deposits, will not be consistent with achieving efficient litter
control. If a fine is insisted upon, the best that can be done will be to
have too little littering, but an inefficiently large litter stock.
2. Because of the public good nature of pollution abatement it may be that the only means of
evaluating its value is through some collective process. See N. Tideman & G. Tullock, A New and
Superior Process for Making Social Choices, 84 J. Pol. Econ., at 1145-59 (Dec. 1976) for a discussion
of an interesting approach for motivating individuals to honestly reveal their demands for a public

good.
3. Throughout the paper "litter fines" will refer to fines on beverage containers which can be
subject to mandatory deposits. Therefore, when considering the possibility of eliminating fines, it
is not fines on all littering that is being suggested, but only on the littering of containers for which
a deposit has been paid. For convenience, "litter" will henceforth refer only to the litter of containers
which can be subject to mandatory deposits.
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In the next section a formal model of litter control with mandatory
deposits will be developed and discussed. It will be established that
achieving dynamic efficiency with respect to the littering rate, the litter
recovery rate, and the corresponding rate of growth in the litter stock can
be achieved with a mandatory deposit. In the last section it will be assumed
that the deposit is constrained to be less than its ideal level and the second
best response to this situation is investigated. In this situation second best
will require a fine on littering, but in comparison to the efficient solution
it will also require excessive litter and not enough littering. Some concluding remarks are offered in the final section.
MANDATORY DEPOSITS AND LITTER CONTROL
Normally it is not the case that pollution taxation provides the opportunity to reduce pollution further by collecting and redeeming it for the
tax. This is the case with mandatory deposits. These deposits dramatically
reduce the transaction cost between those who place a high value on the
convenience of littering and those who place a lower value on the inconvenience of recovering litter. So mandatory deposits both discourage
litter and encourage its recovery.
To formally look at the implications of mandatory deposits for litter
control, we let L(t) be the littering rate, R(t) be the recovery rate, and
S(t) be the litter stock, all at time t. The benefit for littering is given by
the function B(L). The cost of litter recovery, C(R,S) is a function of the
recovery rate and the existing stock. The aesthetic cost associated with
littering is given by the function A(L-R, S) which is based on the plausible
assumption that people are sensitive to both the rate of change in litter
stock and the level of the stock. It will be assumed that these functions
are unaffected by the introduction of mandatory deposits. 4 The objective
of a mandatory deposit policy is to maximize the present value of the net
social gain from littering,
(1)
t(L,R,S) = P.[B(L) - A(L-R,S) - C(R,S)]e- dt,
subject to the constraint
dS(t) = S(t) = L(t) - R(t),
dt

(2)

and the initial condition S(o) = So, where r is the appropriate discount
4. The evidence indicates that consumption of bottled beverages is not appreciably affected by a
move to mandatory deposits, see Porter at 353 (cited in note 1), so the benefits from littering should
be unaffected. On intuitive grounds there seems little reason to expect a significant change in the
aesthetic or recovery cost functions. With litter stock, S, referring only to containers to which
deposits can be applied, it is being assumed that the stock of other litter is unaffected by mandatory
deposits.
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rate. Assuming an interior solution, the necessary conditions are given
by
- rt

[B'(L) - A,(L-R,Se

[A,(L-R,S) -C 1 (R,S)e

- X(t) = 0,

-r

[A2(L-R,S) +C,(R,S)]e -

rt

(3)

+ X(t) = 0,

(4)

+ (t) = 0,

(5)

and the initial condition (S(o) = S,,, where X(t) is the marginal present
value of reducing litter stock at time t [the increase in 41 with respect to
a decrease in S(t)]. The efficient solution will be denoted L*(t), R*(t),
S*(t), and X*(t).'
The intuition behind the necessary conditions is straight forward. Condition (3), which can be rewritten as
B'(L)e

=

A(L-RS)e -

rt

+ X,

(3')

requires, in present value terms, that the marginal benefit from littering
equal the marginal aesthetic cost of littering plus the marginal cost of
increasing the litter stock. Expressing (4) as
CI(R,S)e -

rt

= A,(L-R,S)e -

rt

+ X

(4')

it is seen that litter recovery should be extended until the marginal cost
of this recovery also equals the right hand side of (3'), now expressed
as the marginal aesthetic benefit of recovery plus the marginal benefit of
reducing the litter stock. Together conditions (3') and (4') require that
the marginal benefit from littering always equal the marginal cost of
recovering litter, a rather obvious efficiency requirement. The relationship
between X and its time rate of change . is obtained by first recognizing
that
(L*,R*,S*)
aS X*((6)

*(t)

= -

[A2(L*R*,S*)

-

C2(R*,S*)e

From (5) this implies that
X*(t) = -i*(t);

(7)

when the solution calls for a reduction in stock, X*(t) > 0, the marginal
value of stock reduction will be decreasing.
5. Unless it clarifies the discussion, the time argument will be omitted. Primes represent derivatives
and subscripts represent partial derivatives with respect to the indicated argument, The satisfaction
of the second order conditions will be assumed, with the following restrictions imposed: B' > 0,
B" < 0, A, > 0, A,, > 0, A, > 0, A 22 > 0, C, > 0, C,, > 0, C2 <0, C

<0.

2 >

0, A12 > 0, and C12
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From (3') and (4') it follows that if the mandatory deposit
(8)

D*(t) = A,(L*-R*,S*) + h*(t)e

is imposed at time t (we assume X* converges to zero in finite time) the
efficient rate of littering and litter recovery will be motivated. Adding a
littering fine to this deposit, or any deposit, serves as a wedge between
B'(L) and C,(R,S) and cannot be efficient.' As long as B'(L) exceeds
CI(R,S) gains can be realized by increasing both the littering and recovery
rates.
Assuming an initial stock that is inefficiently large, X*(o) > 0, the
efficient solution at t = 0 is illustrated in Figure 1. The deposit D* will
motivate a littering rate of L*, where the marginal benefit curve equals
D*. The marginal recovery cost curve originates over L* with recovery
proceeding in the direction of negative littering until marginal recovery
cost equals D* at the recovery rate R*. With the recovery rate exceeding

A (L-R, S)

X*(o

I

IB

L*-R*

W

L*

0

Littering

FIGURE 1

6. The mandatory deposit has facilitated an exchange between litterers and litter retrievers which
has served to eliminate what J. M. Buchanan & W. C. Stubblebine, Externality, 29 Economica 37184 (Nov. 1962) refer to as Pareto-relevant externalities. As the Buchanan and Stubblebine paper
establishes, imposing a tax (fine) under these circumstances is inconsistent with efficiency.
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the littering rate the litter stock is being reduced and both the marginal
benefit from littering and the marginal cost of recovery exceeds the marginal aesthetic cost of littering by the positive marginal benefit of stock
reduction, X*(o). Even though efficiency requires a reduction in litter
stock, it also requires a positive rate of littering. Even if the marginal
aesthetic cost of littering exceeds the marginal benefit for all positive
littering rates, efficiency is still very likely to require positive littering.
All that would be required is B'(L) to exceed C, (o,S) over some initial
interval of positive littering rates.
Given the initial solution depicted in Figure I the litter stock will be
declining and the solution will be changing through time. The dynamics
of the solution can be presented at an intuitive level. 7 With X*(o) > 0
we know from (7) that X* will decrease through time. Eventually ,* will
decline to zero, at which time i* also becomes zero and the steady-state
litter stock will have been reached; L* = R*. As this approach is made
the A, curve will be shifting down and the C, curve up (recall from
footnote 5 that A12 > 0), with their intersection occurring at zero net
littering when the steady-state litter stock is reached. This steady-state
solution is exhibited in Figure 2. In the approach to this solution D* may
be increasing, decreasing, or remaining constant, depending on the relative shifts in A, and C1. Therefore, the efficient littering rate L* may be
decreasing, increasing or remaining the same. If the littering rate is remaining constant or decreasing, then the recovery rate R* is decreasing
as the net littering rate increases to zero. Otherwise, R* may be either
increasing or decreasing as steady-state is approached.
A LITTERING FINE AND SECOND BEST
We now turn to the inefficiencies that result from the use of a littering
fine to control litter. We do this by acknowledging that conditions could
be such that a littering fine would be advisable on the basis of second
best considerations. If, for example, it is simply not possible to increase
the deposit to the ideal level then it is possible to increase efficiency by
imposing a fine on littering. But the best that can be done when the ideal
fine is imposed will find both environmental and convenience gains realized if increases in the deposit could be substituted for reductions in
the fine.
7. Given the objectives of the paper there is little to be gained from an extremely rigorous
development of the dynamics of the model. Interesting questions can be usefully answered without
great concern that the efficient solution will not converge to a stable equilibrium. For a more rigorous
dynamic analysis of a waste accumulation model, but one which focuses on different issues than
are addressed here, see V. L. Smith, Dynamics of Waste Accumulation, 86 Q.J. Econ., at 600-16
(Nov. 1972).
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The formal analysis of this second best situation requires the maximization of (1)subject to (2)and the additional constraint
C,(R,S) = 15,
(9)
whereI isthe maximum mandatory deposit which isless than D*(t) for
all t.The necessary conditions for achieving this maximization are
(10)
[B'(L) - A,(L-R,S)]e - r t - x(t) = 0
[A,(L-R,S) -

C,(R,S)]e

[AA(L-R,S) + C2(R,S)]e

- rt

- 0(t) CII(R,S) + X(t) =0

- rt +

0(t)

CI2(R,S) +

t)

=0

(11l)

(12)

and the initial conditions S(o) = So, where X is again the present value
of a marginal decrease in the litter stock and 0 is the present value of a
marginal increase in the mandatory deposit. The resulting second best
solution is denoted, Q~t), R(t), 9(t), K(t), and 0(t).
Again making the reasonable assumption that the initial stock exceeds
the efficient level, ,(o) > 0, we diagram the solution in.Figure 3. If the
only deterrent to littering were the mandatory deposit D, the litter rate
would be L. With the deposit motivating a recovery rate of R, the
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FIGURE 3

net littering rate would be L-R. This situation finds the marginal
benefit from littering less than the marginal aesthetic cost. Thus from
(10) it follows that gains can be realized by imposing a littering fine with
an expected value large enough to discourage littering beyond the rate
where B'(L) exceeds A(L-R,S) by .(o).' The expected fine which motivates the second best solution is shown in Figure 3 as E(F), the difference
between B'(L) and Cl(lk, S.) which equals, from (10) and (11), 0(o)C,,
(R, So). This fine, along with the mandatory deposit, reduces littering to
L-R. Note that any decrease in the mandatory deposit,with an offsetting
increase in E(F), would leave the littering rate the same but, by reducing
the incentive to recover litter, increase the net littering rate. Thus in order
to bring net littering back down to the second best rate E(F) will have to
be further increased. 9 So a reduction in the mandatory deposit requires
an increase in the marginal littering penalty and thus a reduction in
8. It is conveniently assumed that only risk neutral individuals litter beverage containers. To the
extent that they are risk averse, a smaller fine than indicated in Figure 3 will be required. Of course
the expected fine depends as much on the level of enforcement as it does the severity of the fine.
9. The second best net littering rate will increase in response to a decrease in the mandatory
deposit so this further increase in E(F) will not have to reduce the net littering rate back to the
original rate.
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littering. The littering rate will be lower when both mandatory deposits
and fines are employed than when litter control relies entirely on mandatory deposits.
But concern is not entirely with the littering rate, but also with the
litter stock. To examine the effect on litter stock of imposing a littering
fine we consider the modification of (6)
as(L,RS) = - X(t) = - [A2(L-k,g) - C2(,S)le(6')
aS(t)
('
Equation (6'), along with (12), implies
(t) = -X(t) -

o(t)
C,2(1,S).

(13)

Now consider a situation where the marginal value of stock reduction
is the same under the mandatory deposit policy as under the combination
deposit-fine policy; *(t) = (t). From (7) and (13) it follows that
- i* = -C,

2.

(14)

The cross partial C, 2 is negative, (9) is a binding constraint so 0 is
positive, and so the right hand side of (14) is positive. Therefore (14)
informs us that the marginal value of stock reduction is not declining as
rapidly under the deposit-fine policy as under deposits. This implies that
the stock of litter will not be reduced as quickly by the deposit-fine policy
as it would by a policy which relies entirely on deposits."° Also notice
from (13) that whenX= 0 we find X > 0. Under the best possible depositfine policy the litter stock will never be reduced to the efficient level, the
level which would be reached under the efficient deposit policy. This
establishes that the litter stock will be smaller when entire reliance is
placed on mandatory deposits than when deposits are in addition to a
littering fine. The overall effect of shifting from the best deposit policy
to the best deposit-fine policy is to reduce littering but increase litter.
This rather counter-intuitive conclusion of our second best analysis
depends on the assumption that the C,(R,S) curve lies below the B'(L)
curve. With this being the case the advantage of the deposit, which cannot
be compensated for with a fine, is its ability to motivate the cheapest
means of litter abatement: recovering it after it has been discarded. It is
fully anticipated that some will object that surely it must be less costly
to refrain from littering beverage containers than to recover them after
they have been littered. But this is almost certainly not true. The cost of
any choice (for example, keep the container in the car for later disposal
or toss it along the roadside) is ultimately a subjective evaluation of an
10. In fact the second best deposit-fine policy could be motivating an increase in litter stock when
the efficient deposit policy would motivate a reduction.
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alternative foregone." It is surely the case that some will value more
highly the convenience of not having empty containers in the car to dispose
of later than others will value the alternatives to spending an afternoon
collecting them. The mandatory deposit takes advantage of this difference
in costs by facilitating a mutually advantageous exchange between litterers
and those who recover it: primarily the young, the disabled, the unemployed and the retired. 2
It is true, of course, that state governments provide some litter collection through highway departments. However, this collection is infrequent.' 3 Supporters of mandatory deposits will surely agree that state
collection leaves a substantial contribution to be made by recovery motivated by deposits on beverage containers; these containers making up
approximately 60 percent of all litter by volume. 4 One suspects that with
existing state litter collection even a low deposit will still motivate some
private recovery of beverage containers, in which case our analysis is
unaffected." It should also be pointed out that relying on government
litter recovery rather than private recovery can be expected to increase
the efficient stock of litter because it will increase recovery cost. Without
the incentives provided by a residual claimant the motivation for leastcost collection is blunted with government recovery. Also government
recovery will generally involve employees with higher opportunity cost
than those who would respond to the recovery incentives provided by
deposits.
It could be argued that the purpose of mandatory deposits is to internalize the existing solid waste externalities which result from the normal
disposal of beverage containers, with the expected fine serving as a tax
on littering. Although this argument suggests a legitimate concern (externalities from solid waste), it also suggests a rather feeble approach.
According to the E.P.A., beverage containers account for only 7 percent
of the nation's solid waste.' 6 Mandatory deposits certainly cannot represent a serious threat to any inefficiency arising from solid waste disposal.
Anyone who feels that this is a serious problem should find more virtue
in a policy which imposes a marginal charge on the disposal of all house11. See J. M. Buchanan, Cost and Choice: An Inquiry in Economic Theory; especially at 30-34
and 42-47.
12. According to a Coors survey, this group is responsible for returning approximately 70% of
cans recycled to Coors. See Porter at 367 (cited in note I).
13. One of the authors was told by Mr. Ward Sutthin, a supervisor for the Virginia State Highway
Department, that the collection frequency for a given section of highway in Virginia is about twice
a year.
14. See Porter at 359 (cited in note 1).
15. Note that if state recovery is expanded beyond the point where private recovery in response
to the deposit ceases, then efficiency requires that any increase in state recovery be accompanied
by a decrease in the penalty for littering.
16. See Porter at 360 (cited in note 1).
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hold and commercial trash, which would require moving away from
public trash collection financed through general taxation or lump sum
fees.' 7
CONCLUSION
The analysis of this paper provides strong support for the view that
mandatory deposits provide an efficient approach for controlling beverage
container litter. But it provides equally strong support for the elimination
of the fine for littering containers carrying the deposit. The best that can
be done with a deposit-fine combination is less littering but more litter
than if the fine were eliminated and the best mandatory deposit imposed.
If for some reason it is not possible to impose a deposit high enough to
achieve efficiency, then a second best argument does exist for supplementing the deposit with a fine. However, once the mandatory deposit
approach is politically accepted the limits on the magnitude of the deposit
do not seem very severe. The 2 to 5 cent deposit imposed in Oregon
motivates such a large reduction in littering, according to its supporters,
that there can be legitimate concern that the 10 cent deposit in Michigan
is much too high.
The supporters of mandatory deposits are justified in their enthusiasm
for this approach to litter control. But apparently they do not realize how
justified they are, or what a strong case they have. If they did, they would
be opposed to diluting the impact of the deposit with a less effective
littering fine.

17. It can be argued that a littering fine in addition to the mandatory deposit is appropriate if the
aesthetic losses from littering are location specific (e.g., especially high in national parks). We are
indebted to Charles Howe for calling our attention to this point.

